COUNT I <p>
<p>
(Obstruction of Congress)<p>
<p>
Introduction<p>
<p>
1. From 1981 to November 1987, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, was 
the Secretary of Defense and a statutory member of the National Security 
Council ("NSC").<p>
2. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the Secretary of Defense was 
the head of the Department of Defense ("DoD").<p>
3. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the NSC was a government 
entity established by the National Security Act of 1947, whose statutory 
members were the President of the United States, the Vice President, the 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. The NSC advised the 
President on the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies 
relating to the national security; facilitated cooperation among the 
military services and other departments and agencies of the government in 
matters involving the national security; and reviewed, guided and directed 
foreign intelligence and covert action activities.<p>
4. Beginning with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran on or about January 
16, 1979, and the seizure of the United States Embassy in Iran and its 
staff on November 4, 1979, relations between the United States Government 
and the Government of Iran were characterized by mutual hostility and 
tension. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the United States 
Government embargoed arms sales to Iran. In January 1984, Secretary of 
State George P. Shultz designated Iran as a sponsor of international 
terrorism and, thereafter, the United States Government actively urged its 
allies not to permit the shipment of arms to Iran, in part because of its 
sponsorship of international terrorism and the continuation of the 
Iran-Iraq war.<p>
5. In August 1985, Robert C. McFarlane, the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, briefed President Ronald Reagan, Secretary 
Shultz, and the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, about an Israeli proposal 
to sell arms to Iran to obtain the release of Americans held hostage in 
Lebanon. The defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, and Secretary Shultz 
objected to the plan and advised the President against it. This plan and 
subsequent efforts to obtain the release of the hostages through the sale 
of arms to Iran became known as the Iran initiative.<p>
6. In August and September of 1985, United States Government officials 
were informed that Israel had shipped 508 United States-supplied TOW 
anti-tank missiles to Iran with the expectation that the United States 
Government would provide Israel with replacement TOW missiles. Following 
these Israeli TOW shipments to Iran, the Reverend Benjamin Weir, an 
American held hostage in Lebanon, was released from captivity.<p>
7. On November 9, 1985, Mr. McFarlane told the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, about new negotiations with Iranians and Israelis involving 
the exchange of arms for hostages.<p>
8. On November 10, 1985, Mr. McFarlane told the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, that the current proposal involved the release of all American 
hostages and the transfer to Iran, through the Israelis, of HAWK 
anti-aircraft missiles.<p>
9. On Tuesday, November 19, 1985, Mr. McFarlane asked the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, to try to obtain 500 HAWK missiles for 
sale to Israel to "pass on" to Iran in return for which five hostages 
would be released on Thursday, November 21, 1985. Major General Colin L. 
Powell, the Senior Military Assistant to the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, made efforts to determine whether 500 HAWK missiles were 
available and what legal requirements would apply to the sale. General 
Powell reported to the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, that 500 HAWK 
missiles could not be sold to Israel or Iran without Congressional 
notification and that breaking the sale into several packages of 28 HAWKs 
each (to keep the value of each package under a $14 million Congressional 
notification threshold) would be a clear violation of law. The defendant, 
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, provided this information to Mr. McFarlane.<p>
10. On Wednesday, November 20, 1985, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, 
told Mr. McFarlane that he objected to the sale of arms for hostages. Mr. 
McFarlane responded that the President had already decided to do it 
through Israel.<p>
11. Later that day, Wednesday, November 20, 1985, Mr. McFarlane informed 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, that the Israelis would sell 120 
HAWKs to the Iranians, and that there would be a hostage release on 
Friday, November 22, 1985.<p>
12. On or about Sunday, November 24, 1985, a cargo of 18 HAWK missiles was 
sent from Israel to Iran. United States Government officials were informed 
that the Iranians were dissatisfied with the cargo, and additional HAWK 
missiles were not sent.<p>
13. On December 7, 1985, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, attended a 
meeting at the White House with President Reagan, Chief of Staff to the 
President Donald T. Regan, Secretary Shultz, Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence John N. McMahon, newly-appointed Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter, and Mr. 
McFarlane, who recently had resigned his position as Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. Mr. McFarlane reviewed the 
development of the Iran initiative up to that point, including the TOW 
missile shipments prior to the release of the Reverend Weir and the 
November 1985 HAWK missile shipment. Mr. McFarlane then outlined a plan 
for additional sales of weapons through Israel to Iran to obtain the 
release of the remaining American hostages. The defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, argued that the United States had an embargo in effect that 
made arms sales to Iran illegal, that the President could not violate the 
embargo, and that "washing" the transaction through Israel would not make 
it legal. President Reagan responded that he could answer charges of 
illegality but that he could not answer the charge that he had passed up a 
chance to free the hostages.<p>
14. Following the December 7, 1985 meeting, President Reagan sent Mr. 
McFarlane to London to open negotiations with Iranian and Israeli 
representatives, without making any United States commitment to transfer 
arms.<p>
15. On December 10, 1985, following Mr. McFarlane's return from London, 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, attended a meeting at the White House 
with President Reagan, Chief of Staff Regan, Director of Central 
Intelligence William J. Casey, Admiral Poindexter, and Mr. McFarlane. At 
the meeting, Mr. McFarlane recommended that no more arms be sold to Iran, 
but he also reminded the group that the United States still had to 
replenish the 500 TOW missiles that Israel had shipped to Iran before the 
Reverend Weir was released.<p>
16. On January 6, 1986, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, met with 
Admiral Poindexter, who outlined a new Israeli plan to sell weapons to 
Iran to obtain the release of the American hostages. The defendant, CASPAR 
W. WEINBERGER, objected to the plan.<p>
17. On January 7, 1986, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, attended a 
meeting at the White House with President Reagan, Vice President George 
Bush, Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, Director Casey and Secretary 
Shultz. At the meeting, the President favored the plan to sell missiles to 
Iran, through Israel, in exchange for the release of American hostages.<p>
18. On January 17, 1986, President Reagan formally approved, by 
Presidential Finding, a covert plan in which the United States would sell 
the weapons to Iran through an American intermediary, rather than through 
Israel.<p>
19. In furtherance of this plan, during February 1986, 1,000 TOW missiles 
were sold to Iran.<p>
20. Between May and November 1986, additional weapons and related parts 
were sold to Iran, and two Americans held hostage in Lebanon were 
released.<p>
21. In early November 1986, there were public reports that United States 
Government officials had engaged in arms-for-hostages deals with Iran.<p>
22. On November 10, 1986, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, attended a 
White House meeting with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary 
Shultz, Attorney General Meese, Director Casey, Chief of Staff Regan, 
Admiral Poindexter, and Acting Deputy Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs Alton G. Keel, Jr. Admiral Poindexter briefed 
the meeting about operational details of the Iran initiative, but he 
omitted mention of the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment and did not 
acknowledge any United States role in or approval of any shipments prior 
to the Presidential Finding of January 17, 1986.<p>
23. On November 12, 1986, the defendant, CASPAR W.<p>
WEINBERGER, attended a briefing for Congressional leaders at the White 
House with the same officials who attended the November 10, 1986 meeting. 
Admiral Poindexter briefed the Congressional leaders about the Iran 
initiative but, once again, did not acknowledge any United States role in 
or approval of any 1985 shipments, including the November 1985 HAWK 
missile shipment. In response to a question by Senate Minority Leader 
Robert C. Byrd, Admiral Poindexter stated that the initial contacts with 
the Iranians had been in 1985 but there had been no transfer of material 
to Iran then because it took time to assess the contacts and issue a 
Finding.<p>
24. On November 13, 1986, President Reagan addressed the nation and 
purported to set out the facts about the Iran initiative.<p>
25. On November 19, 1986, President Reagan held a news conference about 
the Iran initiative. During the news conference President Reagan said "we, 
as I say, have had nothing to do with other countries or their shipments 
of arms or doing what they're doing," and he denied that a third country 
had been involved in shipments of United States arms to Iran.  Later that 
evening, President Reagan acknowledged that, in fact, a third country had 
been involved. But the President did not disclose that arms shipments had 
taken place in 1985, that the third country was Israel, or that he had 
approved any of the 1985 shipments.<p>
26. During the period leading up to November 24, 1986, officials within 
the White House and other Executive branch agencies expressed repeated 
concern that the 1985 arms shipments to Iran, and in particular the 
November 1985 HAWK missile shipment, had been illegal.<p>
27. On or about November 20, 1986, Abraham D. Sofaer, the Legal Adviser of 
the Department of State, objected to proposed testimony by Director Casey, 
which stated that no one in the United States Government had 
contemporaneous knowledge of the November 1985 HAWK missile shipment. Mr. 
Sofaer was aware of a contemporaneous note from November 1985 indicating 
that Mr. McFarlane had told Secretary Shultz about the impending shipment. 
Secretary Shultz supported Mr. Sofaer's efforts to prevent this false 
testimony.<p>
28. From November 21 until November 24, 1986, Attorney General Meese 
interviewed some of the United States Government officials who had known 
about the Iran initiative. One of the central topics in these interviews 
was the extent of knowledge of United States Government officials of the 
November 1985 HAWK missile shipment from Israel to Iran.<p>
29. On Sunday, November 23, 1986, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi 
Arabian Ambassador to the United States, met with the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER. Prince Bandar told the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, that 
during a recent meeting with President Reagan's wife, Nancy Reagan, she 
had said that she thought Secretary Shultz had been disloyal to the 
President during the crisis resulting from the revelation of the Iran 
initiative and that he should be replaced as Secretary of State. Prince 
Bandar reported that he had then proposed to Mrs. Reagan that the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, replace Secretary Shultz, and that Mrs. 
Reagan had commented favorably on that proposal.<p>
30. On November 24, 1986, Attorney General Meese met at the White House 
with President Reagan, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, Director 
Casey, Chief of Staff Regan, Admiral Poindexter and the defendant, CASPAR 
W. WEINBERGER. Mr. Meese told the group that the November 1985 Israeli 
HAWK missile shipment may have been illegal, but that the President did 
not know about the shipment at the time. At the end of the meeting, Mr. 
Meese asked whether anyone knew of anything else that had not been 
revealed. No one contradicted Mr. Meese's incorrect statement concerning 
President Reagan's lack of knowledge, although several of those present, 
including the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, had contrary information.<p>
31. On November 25, 1986, Attorney General Meese announced at a press 
conference that proceeds generated from mark-ups in the sales of arms to 
Iran had been diverted to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, also known 
as the Contras. In response to a question about the Iran initiative, Mr. 
Meese said that the President had not been informed about the November 
1985 HAWK missile shipment until February 1986.<p>
32. Following the November 25, 1986 press conference, several 
Congressional Committees conducted investigations and held hearings on 
these topics.<p>
33. On December 17, 1986, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, testified 
about the Iran initiative in closed session before the United States 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. With regard to the November 1985 
Israeli HAWK missile shipment to Iran, the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, testified as follows:<p>
Q. In the period of time from approximately November 16th to November 21st 
of 1985, the President was in Geneva for the summit meeting with Mr. 
Gorbachev. And at or about that same time, one of the arms transfers to 
the Iranians was under way and there is some evidence that there was 
discussions [sic] at various highest levels relative to that. Do you have 
any reason to recollect being aware at that particular point in time of 
discussions?<p>
A. No. I was not in Geneva at those meetings and I did not have any 
recollection of that. I know that may have been about the time I saw one 
of these first [intelligence reports] that I mentioned to you earlier. But 
that was all -- my impression was that the plan was not being put forward 
actively, was no longer being considered. And this was confirmed in my 
view in the President's reaction at the December 6th [sic -- December 7] 
meeting that I have mentioned.<p>
* * *<p>
A. . . . And certainly there was no discussion in that meeting [December 
7, 1985] of any transfers that Israel or anybody else had been permitted 
to make or anything of that kind.<p>
34. For many years, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, took daily notes 
of his activities. These handwritten notes contain an extensive record of 
what the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, did on a daily basis, and 
include summaries of telephone conversations and meetings. During 1985 and 
1986, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, took nearly 1,700 pages of 
daily notes. These daily notes contain, among other things, summaries of 
conversations and meetings described in paragraphs 7-11, 13, 15-17 and 29 
of this Count of the Indictment. These notes disclose that in November 
1985, in advance of the HAWK missile shipment to Iran, the defendant, 
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, was told that President Reagan had authorized the 
shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran, through the Israelis, in order to 
obtain the release of American hostages held in Lebanon.<p>
35. During 1985 and 1986 the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, also took 
hundreds of pages of notes during highlevel meetings, in addition to the 
daily notes described in the preceding paragraph. These meeting notes 
contain, among other things, a record of what occurred at meetings 
described in paragraphs 15-17, 22, 23 and 30 of this Count of the 
Indictment. These meeting notes show that, a few days after the November 
1985 HAWK missile shipment, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, informed 
President Reagan that such arms shipments were illegal, and that one year 
later, during the meeting of November 24, 1986 described in paragraph 30 
above, Attorney General Meese expressed concern that the November 1985 
shipment was illegal.<p>
36. On January 6, 1987, the United States Senate, by Senate Resolution 23, 
established the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan opposition ("Senate Select Committee"). On January 7, 1987, 
the United States House of Representatives, by House Resolution 12, 
established the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions 
with Iran ("House Select Committee"). The two Chambers instructed their 
respective Committees (collectively, "Select Committees") to work together 
and charged them with investigating, among other things, any activity of 
any officer or entity of the United States Government relating to the Iran 
initiative.<p>
37. On March 11, 1987, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, met with 
counsel to the Senate Select Committee and DoD General Counsel H. Lawrence 
Garrett, III. A Senate Select Committee staff memorandum prepared 
following the meeting states, in relevant part:<p>
Weinberger offered that some of his recollections of these matters were a 
bit fuzzy, and added "I have the deepest sympathy for the President's 
memory problem." He then added that he "should have done what Henry 
Kissinger did after every meeting, he would dictate a thorough memo of 
what transpired, which was used in writing his memoirs. For me, after I 
finish a meeting, I go off to another meeting." While Weinberger did not 
expressly deny that he kept diaries or dictated his thoughts about a day's 
events, with these comments he clearly left the impression that he did not 
make such notes or recordings.<p>
38.  On or about April 4, 1987, the Senate Select Committee requested that 
the DoD produce to it all documents relating to the Iran initiative, 
including "notes, ...diaries, ... or other such records, of attendance at, 
recollection of, or participation in, ... any meetings, discussions, 
conferences, or events pertaining to the Committee's inquiry, prepared by 
and/or in the possession of" certain individuals, including the defendant, 
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER.<p>
39.  On or about April 14, 1987, the House Select Committee requested that 
the DoD produce to it all documents relating to the Iran initiative, 
including "calendars, logs, diaries, appointment books, records of 
meetings, and handwritten notes kept by or on behalf of" certain 
individuals, including the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER.<p>
40. The defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, ordered the DoD Office of General 
Counsel to produce to the Select Committees documents responsive to the 
requests of the Select Committees. The defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, 
instructed senior officials in the DoD to comply with the requests, but 
withheld and concealed his daily notes and, with one exception, his 
relevant meeting notes. As a result, none of the defendant's, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER's, daily notes and only one of his relevant meeting notes were 
provided to the Committees.<p>
41. On June 17, 1987, members of the Select Committees' staffs took 
deposition testimony under oath from the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, 
in his office at the Pentagon. DoD General Counsel Garrett and DoD 
Assistant General Counsel Edward J. Shapiro also attended the deposition. 
One of the purposes of the questioning was to determine whether the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, had kept notes. During the deposition, 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, concealed the existence of his daily 
notes and the extent of notes he had taken during meetings in 1985 and 
1986.<p>
42. Pursuant to House Resolution 12, which established the House Select 
Committee, the June 17, 1987 deposition is deemed to have been taken in 
the District of Columbia.<p>
43. During the June 17, 1987 deposition, the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, made the following statements:<p>
Q.  We have gone over a number of meetings?<p>
A.  Yes<p>
Q.  Of course, your recollection is better on some and fainter on 
others.<p>
A.  Yes.<p>
Q.  Is there any way that you have of making a record of the highlights of 
meetings of this nature?<p>
A.  Now?<p>
Q.  No, then.<p>
A.  No. There wasn't. I did dictate a memorandum on this particular one 
[referring to a November 10, 1986 meeting], but I've often said that I 
understand that Henry Kissinger made a memo of every meeting he ever 
attended and that enabled him to write his book rapidly. I wish I had done 
that with day one of the administration. I am usually getting ready for 
the next meeting and don't have time to write these memorandums. I took 
notes about this one and dictated this memorandum because it seemed to be 
important.<p>
Q.  Do you ever take notes that are not dictated or make jottings when you 
get back?<p>
A.  Yes, occasionally, but comparatively rarely. I don't know we kept 
those in any formal way. I don't think they have been filed or labeled. My 
handwriting is notoriously bad. I have trouble even reading it myself. 
Occasionally take a few notes, but not really very often.<p>
Q.  If there is any chance there are --<p>
A.  I think we made this examination and whatever there is is in our 
so called C&D, Correspondence and Directives. They have been asked to paw 
through everything.<p>
* * *<p>
Q.  Are you aware of any other potential source of -- that might be -- 
have made a record that might supplement your memory of some of these 
meetings?<p>
A.  Well, I don't really think of anything. We could paw through 
everything again. We have done that, I think, pretty well.<p>
44. Thereafter, until he left the DoD, the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, withheld the aforementioned notes. Thereafter, he deposited 
these notes in the Library of Congress in the District of Columbia, where 
public access to the notes was subject to his exclusive personal 
control.<p>
45. It was material to the Select Committees' investigations to obtain any 
written materials, including contemporaneous notes, of the defendant, 
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, that contained information relating to what the 
President and other senior government officials had known or done in 
connection with proposals to ship arms to Iran in 1985, contributions to 
the Contras, and other topics within the scope of the investigation of the 
Select Committees.<p>
<p>
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:<p>
<p>
46. From on or about March 11, 1987, up to and including August 3, 1987, 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, acting unlawfully, willfully and 
knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and endeavor to 
influence, obstruct and impede the due and proper exercise of the power of 
inquiry of the Select Committees in that, during the aforesaid time 
period, he caused the DoD not to provide to the Select Committees, in 
response to their document requests, handwritten notes relating to the 
Iran initiative and support for the Contras, by<p>
a. withholding his daily notes and all but one of his relevant meeting 
notes from the Select Committees, and<p>
b. concealing from the Select Committees the existence of these notes 
while professing to comply with the document requests of the Select 
Committees, all with the intent to corruptly influence, obstruct and 
impede the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry of the Select 
Committees. (In Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
1505.)<p>
<p>
COUNT II<p>
<p>
(False Statement)<p>
<p>
1. Paragraphs 1 through 45 of Count I Indictment are realleged and 
incorporated by reference.<p>
2. At all times relevant to this Indictment, the Contras were insurgents 
engaged in military and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.<p>
3. From in or about December 1981 until on or about October 11, 1984, the 
United States Government, acting principally through the CIA, pursuant to 
written Presidential Findings, had provided the Contras with financial 
support, arms and military equipment, as well as with supervision and 
instruction, tactical and other advice, coordination, intelligence and 
direction.<p>
4. On October 12, 1984, Public Law 98-473 was enacted. It prohibited funds 
available to the CIA, the DoD, and certain other agencies and entities of 
the United States from being obligated or expended in support of military 
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, stating in relevant part:<p>
During fiscal year 1985 no funds available to the Central Intelligence 
Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the 
United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or 
expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, 
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua 
by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual.<p>
<p>
This provision of law was commonly known as the Boland Amendment.<p>
5. On or about March 13, 1985, General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, informed the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, that 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United 
States, had stated that Saudi Arabia was contributing funds to the 
Contras. The defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, repeated this information to 
Mr. McFarlane.<p>
6. On or about March 15, 1985, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, 
informed Director of Central Intelligence Casey and Deputy Director of 
Central Intelligence McMahon that he had heard that Prince Bandar had 
earmarked $25 million for the Contras, in $5 million increments.<p>
7. During the summer of 1986, reports appeared in the press alleging that 
the Saudis had contributed money to the Contras as part of an informal 
arrangement connected with the sale of AWACs aircraft to Saudi Arabia. A 
July 27, 1986 article in the San Francisco Examiner cited intelligence 
sources who stated that the Saudi contribution "was but the latest example 
of a longstanding practice of financing U.S. covert operations with money 
set aside from foreign military sales." By letter dated August 12, 1986, 
Representative Dante B. Fascell, Chairman of the United States House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, sent a copy of the San 
Francisco Examiner article to the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, and 
asked him to respond to these allegations.<p>
8. The defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, responded to Congressman Fascell 
in a letter dated September 4, 1986, which began as follows:<p>
I am pleased to have the opportunity to respond to your letter of August 
12, in which you raise a number of important questions regarding alleged 
funding of Contra aid through the Foreign Military Sales system. I, too, 
saw the San Francisco Examiner article and regarded the allegation of 
Saudi funding of U.S. assistance to anti-government forces in Nicaragua as 
so outlandish as to be unworthy of comment from the Department.<p>
<p>
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:<p>
<p>
9.   On June 17, 1987, in a deposition deemed to have been taken in the 
District of Columbia, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, unlawfully, 
knowingly and willfully made a material false, fictitious and fraudulent 
statement to a department or agency of the United States, to wit, the 
House Select Committee, in a matter within its jurisdiction, to wit, its 
investigation of the Iran initiative and certain aspects of assistance for 
the Contras.<p>
10. It was material to the House Select Committee's investigation to 
determine what the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, had known about Saudi 
Arabian contributions to the Contras.<p>
11. On June 17, 1987, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, appearing as a 
witness before duly authorized staff of the House Select Committee, made 
the following statement, knowing it to be false, fictitious and 
fraudulent:<p>
Q.  Do you recall learning at some point that the Saudis or some people 
connected with the Saudis provided funds for the contras?<p>
A.  No. I don't have any memory of any contra funding or of anything 
connected with the Saudis that I can remember now.<p>
12. The above underscored material statement made to the duly authorized 
staff of the House Select Committee by the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, was false, fictitious and fraudulent, as the defendant, CASPAR 
W. WEINBERGER, then and there well knew, in that he had been informed in 
March 1985 that the Saudi Ambassador was contributing funds to the 
Contras.<p>
<p>
(In Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001.)<p>
<p>
COUNT III<p>
<p>
(Perjury)<p>
<p>
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:<p>
1. Paragraphs 1 through 45 of Count I of this Indictment are realleged and 
incorporated by reference.<p>
 2. On July 31, 1987, in the District of Columbia, the defendant, CASPAR 
W. WEINBERGER, having duly taken an oath before competent tribunals, to 
wit, the Select Committees, in a case in which the law of the United 
States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he would testify 
truthfully in proceedings before the Select Committees, did  willfully and 
contrary to said oath make a material statement that he did not believe to 
be true, as hereinafter set forth.<p>
3. It was material to the Select Committees' investigation to determine 
whether the President and other high-level United States Government 
officials, including the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, knew in November 
1985 of a proposed transfer of HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran.<p>
4. At the time and place set forth in paragraph 2 of this Count, the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, appearing as a witness under oath before 
the Select Committees, was asked the following question and gave the 
following answer, believing the underscored material declaration not to be 
true:<p>
<p>
Mr. Eggleston:  The Committee has also received testimony that on that 
weekend of November 23 and November 24, [1985] there was a shipment of 18 
HAWK missiles from Israel to Iran.  This [Exhibit 8] was a paper that was 
written immediately prior to that time. Let me just ask you: Did you have 
any knowledge that that transfer was to take place?<p>
<p>
<p>
5. The above underscored material declaration made under oath before the 
Select Committees by the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, was not true, as 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, then and there well knew, in that:<p>
a. he had been informed by Mr. McFarlane, on or about November 10, 1985, 
of a proposal that, in connection with the release of Americans held 
hostage in Lebanon, Israel would ship HAWK missiles<p>
b. he had been asked by Mr. McFarlane, on or about November l9, 1985, to 
try to get 500 HAWK missiles for transfer to Iran in connection with the 
release two days later of Americans held hostage in Lebanon;<p>
c. he had been informed by Mr. McFarlane, on or about November 20, 1985, 
that President Reagan had decided to sell HAWK missiles to Iran through 
the Israelis; and<p>
d. he had been informed by Mr. McFarlane, on or about November 20, 1985, 
that Israel would sell 120 HAWK missiles to Iran, and that Americans held 
hostage in Lebanon would be released two days later.<p>
<p>
(In Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1621.)<p>
<p>
COUNT IV (Perjury)<p>
<p>
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:<p>
<p>
1. Paragraphs 1 through 45 of Count I of this Indictment are realleged and 
incorporated by reference.<p>
<p>
2. On July 31, 1987, in the District of Columbia, the defendant, CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, having duly taken an oath before competent tribunals, to wit, 
the Select Committees, in a case in which the law of the United States 
authorizes an oath to be administered, that he would testify truthfully in 
proceedings before the Select Committees, did  willfully and contrary to 
said oath make a material statement that he did not believe to be true, as 
hereinafter set forth.<p>
3. It was material to the Select Committees' investigation to determine 
whether the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, had contemporaneous knowledge 
of the Israeli desire and need for the replenishment of weapons that 
Israel was sending to Iran.<p>
4. At the time and place set forth in paragraph 2 of this Count, the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, appearing as a witness under oath before 
the Select Committees, was asked the following question and gave the 
following answer, believing the underscored material declaration not to be 
true:<p>
<p>
Mr. Eggleston:  And in addition, there are various documents which are in 
evidence before the Committee which refer to the Israeli desire and need 
for replenishment of weapons that the Israelis were sending. Did you know 
that replenishment was an issue?<p>
<p>
Secretary WEINBERGER: No, I have no memory of that.<p>
<p>
5. The above underscored material declaration made under oath before the 
Select Committees by the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, was not true, as 
the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, then and there well knew, in that:<p>
a. he had in November 1985 ascertained the availability of HAWK missiles 
with which to supply Israel;<p>
b. he had been informed by Mr. McFarlane, on or about November 20, 1985, 
that President Reagan had decided to provide HAWK missiles to Iran through 
Israel; and<p>
c. he had been informed, on or before December 10, 1985, that the United 
States Government still had to replenish 500 TOW missiles to Israel that 
Israel previously had transferred to Iran.<p>
<p>
(In Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1621.)<p>
<p>
COUNT V<p>
<p>
(False Statement)<p>
<p>
THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:<p>
<p>
1. Paragraphs 1 through 45 of Count I of this Indictment are realleged and 
incorporated by reference.<p>
2. On December 19, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Division For the Purpose of Appointing 
Independent Counsels, appointed Lawrence E. Walsh Independent Counsel with 
jurisdiction to investigate possible federal criminal violations by United 
States Government officials "relating in any way" to the Iran initiative 
and support for the Contras.<p>
3. In or about December 1986, the Independent Counsel was assigned Federal 
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") personnel to assist the Independent 
Counsel in his investigation. Since that time the Independent Counsel and 
his staff ("Office of Independent Counsel" or "OIC") have interviewed 
numerous witnesses in connection with his investigation. Such interviews 
are conducted in the presence of a Special Agent of the FBI who takes 
contemporaneous notes of the interview and later prepares a report of the 
witness's statements.<p>
4. On October 10, 1990, members of the Independent Counsel's staff and a 
Special Agent of the FBI interviewed the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, 
in the District of Columbia. During this interview, the defendant, CASPAR 
W. WEINBERGER, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly made material false, 
fictitious and fraudulent statements to a department or agency of the 
United States, to wit, the Office of Independent Counsel, in a matter 
within its jurisdiction, to wit, an investigation into possible violations 
of federal criminal law relating to the Iran initiative and support for 
the Contras.<p>
5. It was material to the Independent Counsel's investigation to determine 
what written materials the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, had created 
that might contain evidence relating to the Iran initiative and support 
for the Contras.<p>
6. On October 10, 1990, the defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, in an 
interview with members of the Independent Counsel's staff and a Special 
Agent of the FBI, made the following statements, as recorded in the 
Special Agent's report of the interview, knowing the underscored material 
statements to be false, fictitious and fraudulent:<p>
Weinberger stated he had some disagreements with the April, 1988, 302 [the 
Special Agent's written report of the April 1988 interview]. His first 
disagreement concerned the sentence on page 2 that stated "He (Weinberger) 
had a habit of making notes on any piece of paper he could get his hands 
on." Weinberqer stated this sentence is misleading because it infers that 
it was his habit to make notes throughout his seven years as Secretary of 
Defense, which was not the case.<p>
*  *  *<p>
Weinberger advised that during his first year as Secretary of Defense, 
from approximately l981 through 1982, he tried to take some notes when he 
attended various high-level meetings. Often he would write on the back of 
pages in the briefing books that were furnished to him for the meetings. 
At the end of the meeting, he would turn the books in to his staff and 
they were broken apart so they could reuse the covers.<p>
Weinberger advised that his secretary, Kay Leisz, used to save his notes 
from these briefing book pages because Weinberger had told her that he 
wanted to dictate memoranda of the meetings based on them. After about a 
year, Leisz came up to Weinberger and said, "You're never really gonna 
dictate from these notes are you?" Weinberger agreed that he was too busy 
to dictate memoranda from these notes and he gave<p>
Leisz permission to discard them. From this point on. Weinberger rarely 
took notes, and when he did, Leisz never saved them for him, except for 
rare occasions.<p>
According to Weinberger, after his first year as Secretary of Defense, he 
did not, as a rule, take any notes when he met with the President or other 
cabinet members. Weinberger stated that it would have been in "bad form" 
to take notes when having a private or relatively private discussion with 
other high ranking Administration officials. No other cabinet member did 
so either, as far as Weinberger is aware. Weinberger specifically recalls 
not taking any notes during his few meetings with the President and other 
cabinet members when the Iranian arms sales matter was discussed. No notes 
were taken by any participant of these meetings, as far as Weinberger is 
aware.<p>
*  *  *<p>
Weinberger was asked which notes or documents he consulted to prepare 
himself for his testimony concerning the Iran/Contra matter before the 
Congressional Committees. Weinberger stated he only would have used his 
notes taken at the November, 1986, Meese briefing, and a copy of the 
McFarlane memorandum with his marginalia on it. Weinberger is not aware of 
anything else he could have consulted.<p>
After meetings, Weinberger did not go back to the Pentagon and make a 
record of the meeting he had just attended, nor did he designate others to 
do so.<p>
Weinberger stated he did not take notes of his phone conversations.<p>
AC [Associate Counsel] Gillen advised Weinberger that the OIC [Office of 
Independent Counsel] has a document, contemporaneously written by someone 
Weinberger would consider credible, which alleges that Weinberger has 
withheld some of his notes concerning the Iran/Contra matter. Gillen would 
not identify the author of the document or further describe the 
document.<p>
Weinberger responded that the allegation is not true and he is distrustful 
of the document's author and his motivations. Weinberger stated that at an 
early cabinet meeting, President Reagan instructed everyone to give 
everything they had to the various investigators, and Weinberger had 
always followed these instructions. Weinberger stated he is not aware of 
any of his notes regarding Iran/Contra that have not been turned over. 
Weinberger stated there may be some oversight at DoD or elsewhere 
concerning the document production, but he has not deliberately withheld 
anything. Weinberger reiterated that he always instructed his staff and 
others at DoD to turn over all notes and documents when requested.<p>
7. The above material statements made to a Special Agent of the FBI by the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, in the presence of members of the 
Independent Counsel's staff were false, fictitious and fraudulent, as the 
defendant, CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, then and there well knew, in that:<p>
a. he had, for years, including nearly seven years as Secretary of 
Defense, regularly taken daily notes of his meetings and telephone 
conversations;<p>
b. he had, as Secretary of Defense, taken notes during meetings with the 
President and other high officials, including meetings related to the 
Iranian arms sales matter, that contained a record of what occurred at 
those meetings;<p>
c. he had extensive notes that had never been provided to the Independent 
Counsel or the Select Committees; and<p>
d. these notes contained information relevant to the Independent Counsel's 
investigation.<p>
(In Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001.)<p>